As we begin the countdown toward an Iraq war, I can’t help remembering America’s – and Israel’s – experiences in Lebanon.
I covered the 1982-1983 Lebanon war, when Israel invaded that country to drive out the guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organization who were based there. I also covered the bitter aftermath, when the United States entered as a peacemaker and was driven out after a suicide bomber blew up 241 Marines in October 1983.
There are two episodes in that war that deserve careful scrutiny by the Bush administration if it wants to avoid costly mistakes in Iraq.
The first involved U.S. troops, who were welcomed by all Lebanese factions as peacekeepers when they first entered the country in September 1982 but wound up viewed by many Lebanese as enemies. President Reagan sent U.S. forces to help Lebanon restore stability after eight years of civil and regional war.
While the troops were there, in badly exposed bases near the Beirut airport, internal Lebanese clashes exploded between Muslim Shia and Christian groups, and between Christians and the Druze sect. The Lebanese government, whose army was dominated by minority Christians, asked for help. Then Reagan’s special troubleshooter Robert “Bud” McFarlane made a fatal mistake.
Unversed in Lebanon’s internecine feuds, McFarlane ordered a U.S. ship offshore to fire at Druze positions in the mountains on Sept. 19, 1983. The shells hit a hospital in the village of Aley; I was in the building next door.
From that moment forth, U.S. forces were seen as a participant in the civil war, on the side of the Christians. Thirty-four days after the shelling of the Druze, a Shia truck bomber blew up the Marine barracks. By April 1984, Reagan had pulled out the remaining troops and withdrawn U.S. ships from Lebanon’s shores.
The lesson for Iraq: Don’t pick sides in internal political struggles. If U.S. troops oust Saddam Hussein, the burden of helping to shape a new Iraqi government falls on U.S. shoulders. Iraqi Kurds, Shia Muslim groups, Sunni factions, liberal democratic exiles, monarchists – all have legitimate claims for a share of power in a new Iraq.
Iraqis must find some inclusive federal formula to satisfy these demands. Some U.S. officials want to pick favorites; they seek to back exiled liberals, and limit religious Shia who have a much more powerful presence on home ground. If this were to happen, U.S. forces could once again become a target. Moreover, the last thing the United States can afford to do is alienate the Shia, a majority of the population which has been denied its rightful share of power since Iraq’s inception.
The aim in Iraq, if we go in, should be to help Iraqis form their own government and then move to the background as soon as possible. If we use our power clumsily, it will boomerang.
The second episode involves the Israelis in Lebanon. What most people don’t realize is that when Israel’s army invaded Lebanon in 1982, many Shia Muslims in south Lebanon rejoiced. The reason: The Shia were fed up at being bossed around and mistreated by PLO forces, who used southern Lebanon as a base from which to attack Israel. When Israel retaliated, Shia villages often got hit.
Nabi Berri, the leader of Amal, the most powerful Shia organization in southern Lebanon at the time, even offered Israel a tacit deal. If Israel pulled back from Lebanon, Amal militiamen would see that the PLO never returned.
But Israel didn’t trust Berri’s promises and wanted a public, signed accord. That, said Berri, was politically impossible.
So Israel stayed in southern Lebanon, scaling back the number of its troops but taking more than 900 military casualties over the years. Reaction to the long-term presence of Israeli troops fostered the growth of a radical Shia movement, Hezbollah, which became far more powerful than Amal.
In May 2000, Israel finally withdrew precipitously from Lebanon. The once-warm welcome by Lebanese Shia had soured into bitter resistance.
U.S. troops may be welcomed in Iraq as liberators at first, especially by Shia and Kurds. But that welcome will wear thin if a U.S. presence lasts too long, is heavy-handed, or becomes viewed as occupation.
The lessons are there. Pay attention. Remember Lebanon.
Trudy Rubin is a columnist and editorial-board member for the Philadelphia Inquirer.
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